Drawing on previous literature and theoretical considerations, the authors identify six key independent variables related to popular religious belief and practice in mainland China: institutional religious affiliation, level of education, income, perspectives on inequality as a social problem, assessment of overall health, and rural residency. Using the 2007 Spiritual Life Study of Chinese Residents, the authors find that Buddhist identity is positively associated with popular religious involvement across measures of popular religious belief and practice. Identifying as a formally committed Buddhist consistently displays the strongest positive relationship with popular religious involvement. The level of education does not reveal a consistent negative association with popular religious adherence, contrary to predictions of classical secularization theory. One measure of existential security theory, feeling inequality is a serious social problem, shows a strong positive relationship with popular religious belief, but not popular religious practices. Finally, despite research highlighting the functional importance of popular religion in rural areas, rural residency is not consistently a significant predictor of popular religious adherence. The implications of these findings are discussed.
. The purpose of this paper is to add to the understanding of the resurgence of popular religion in mainland China by examining factors related to popular religious 1 involvement based on the analysis of recently available survey data. In particular, this paper asks (1) what is the relationship between popular religion and other religious traditions, especially Buddhism, in mainland China? (2) What are the social characteristics that predict popular religious adherence?
This analysis makes an important contribution to the sociological understanding of religion in China for at least two reasons. First, previous researchboth historical works and contemporary ethnographies-has shown that popular religion is intrinsically linked to other religious traditions in China, especially Buddhism (Lin Benxuan 2008; Lin Meirong 2008; Overmyer 1976) . By investigating the extent to which different religions intersect with popular religion, this study provides an opportunity to better understand the link between other religious traditions and popular religion in China (see Fan 2003; Madsen et al. 2001; Overmyer 1972 Overmyer , 1982 . Second, many sociological and anthropological theories and research, such as classical secularization theory, existential security theory, theories about the differences between institutional and loosely organized religions, and studies highlighting the functional roles of popular religion, have highlighted several potential key factors predicting involvement in popular religious activities. Taking advantage of a recent nationwide survey, this research is the first quantitative study to empirically examine whether these factors are related to popular religious activity in mainland China.
We first review literature highlighting the relationship between popular religion and other religious traditions in China. Next, we draw on classical secularization theory and existential security theory that call attention to education and measures of existential security as key variables predicting popular religious adherence. Third, we cite anthropological studies that highlight the role of popular religion in rural China prompting us to include rural residency as an explanatory variable. Next, we describe the methods and findings from statistical models predicting popular religious belief and practice in mainland China. Finally, the implications of the findings are discussed.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POPULAR RELIGION AND OTHER RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS IN CHINA

The Relationship between Popular Religion and Buddhism
Many researchers have noted the eclectic nature of religion in China. For instance, as early as the 1600s, Western Sinologists have pointed out the syncretistic nature of Chinese religion and defined Chinese religion as a complex combination of Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism, and popular religious traditions (Clart 2007; Soothill 1913) . In contemporary China, Buddhism has been found to overlap with popular religious beliefs and practices. Kurtz, for example, describes Buddhism's place in China's diverse religious landscape in this way:
It (Buddhism) became intertwined with indigenous religions of China and elsewhere, especially with Confucianism and Taoism, where the three traditions mingle with other local indigenous ritual practices to create a rich tapestry of spiritual beliefs, practices, and institutions that have evolved. (Kurtz 2007:71) Daniel Overmyer has traced the historical origins of the relationship between Buddhism and popular religion (Jordan and Overmyer 1986; Overmyer 1972 Overmyer , 1976 Overmyer , 1981 Overmyer , 1982 Overmyer , 1990 . Buddhism was a lay movement that started in medieval China; during this time, lay Buddhists adopted many popular religious practices. One reason for this mixing of Buddhism and popular religion was that Chinese popular religion is usually not institutional in form and many popular practices and beliefs are necessarily diffused within institutional religious organizations (Yang 1961) . The syncretic mixing of Buddhism and popular religion can also be attributed to the fact that lay Buddhist sects did not compete with popular religion, but treated popular religion as a supplement to Buddhist practice and even adopted popular religious gods and practices into Buddhism (Overmyer 1990 ). The result of lay Buddhists assimilating popular religious beliefs and practices was the formation of "Folk Buddhism" (Lin Meirong 2008; Overmyer 1976) .
There is evidence that Folk Buddhism is alive and well in China today. For instance, in Fan's (2003) case study of popular religion in a village in Hebei Province, she finds that popular religion and Buddhism were mixed to such an extent that the villagers thought that a popular sectarian scripture passage was Buddhist in origin. In fact, she states that Buddhism and popular religion were sometimes indistinguishable to local villagers. To what extent is this type of religious borrowing and intermixing prevalent in contemporary China on a large scale? Are Buddhists also active in popular religious activities? In this paper, we explore these questions and expect to find that self-identifying with Buddhism is positively associated with involvement in popular religion.
One important caveat is in order here. Although previous research has described a close relationship between Buddhism and popular religion, such a relationship may vary depending on a Buddhist's link to the institutional Sangha.
2 Informed by theories concerning loosely organized and well-organized religions, Buddhists who have closer ties to the institutional Sangha and have formally committed to Buddhism, may be less likely to mix Buddhism and popular religion (Hu and Leamaster 2013; Iannaccone 1995; Lu et al. 2008; Stark 2006a Stark , 2006b ). In particular, Stark and his colleagues define loosely organized religions as having no ties to a formal organization and not requiring exclusivist membership. Conversely, institutional religion often requires exclusive membership, which is established through ritual. According to Iannaccone (1995) , these rituals raise the extent of religious exclusiveness, which allows a religious tradition to prevent members from participating in other religions' activities. It is important to point out that the theoretical ideas of institutional religion and formal conversion were formulated in the Western context. Clear religious boundaries and formal conversion are more akin to Western religions, especially Christianity, whereas Chinese religion is more eclectic and boundaries are fluid-as we note above. Thus, we are not arguing that institutional Buddhism is identical to Western Christianity; however, given previous theorizing on differences between institutional and loosely organized religions, we predict that those Buddhists who have undergone a formal commitment ceremony will be less likely to have involvement in popular religion-although we fully expect to find that formally committed Buddhists also participate in popular religion.
Previous empirical work on Buddhists in China seems to substantiate the conceptual differences between loosely organized and institutional religion. Holmes Welch describes casual Buddhist practitioners (hereafter casual Buddhists or self-identified Buddhists) in pre-Cultural Revolution China as being unorganized and mostly not belonging to formal Buddhist groups while engaging in individualistic practices (Welch 1972:298) . Welch contrasts these Buddhists with the institutional Sangha. It seems likely that this type of Buddhist is more apt to mix popular religion with Buddhism.
3 Therefore, we predict that Buddhists who have undergone commitment rituals, specifically those who have formally taken the three refuges, should be more committed to and have closer ties to institutional Buddhism. Hence, we expect these Buddhists are less likely to mix Buddhism with popular religion.
There are also historical and political reasons to expect that formally committed Buddhists are less likely to engage in an eclectic mix of Buddhist and popular religious practice. Before the advent of Chinese Communist Party (CCP hereafter) rule, Buddhist monks-most notably Taixu-were seeking to modernize Buddhism. Taixu and his fellow reformers felt that Buddhism could be purged of its "superstitious" and "backwards" elements to become viable in a modernized China (Pittman 2001) . After the CCP came to power, it was clear that some of the reforms were of particular use to communist leaders and their goals in terms of religion, such as: a move toward a Buddhism that was more pragmatic and scientific, reforming Buddhism to be more utopian (but still realistic), and the abolition of superstitious practices (i.e., the eclectic mixing with popular religion). After his death in 1950, Taixu's supporters-realizing the potential of reformed, modernized Buddhism to subsist under communist rule-continued the political project of "modernizing" Buddhism. It appears as if Buddhist leaders were at least partially successful at helping Buddhism gain legitimacy under CCP rule (Laliberté 2011; Pittman 2001; Welch 1972) . To sum up, given the efforts of institutional Buddhism to distance itself from popular religion and the theorized boundary differences between institutional and popular religion, we expect to find that Buddhists who have undergone formal commitment ceremonies will be less likely to mix Buddhism and popular religion.
The Relationship between Popular Religion and Other Institutional Religions
While there is a larger literature depicting the affinity between Buddhism and popular religion, the Chinese religious landscape is an amalgamation of popular religion at the local level with Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism (Kurtz 2007; Soothill 1913) . Hence, other religious traditions in China may also be related to popular religious belief and practice.
Some scholars have argued that there is a strong link between Daoism and popular religion (Feuchtwang 2001; Yang 2005 ). This assertion is based on the idea that many popular religious beliefs and practices stem from Daoist textual and oral traditions. We include Daoist identity in our models and test the extent to which Daoist identity is linked to popular religion based on the variables in our analysis.
Catholicism-among lay Catholics-has also been linked to popular religion. According to Madsen et al. (2001) .
The focus on orthodoxy, whether Catholic or Confucian, leads to a neglect of the heterodox, or "superstitious" magic and myth that-to the consternation of Chinese Church and government leaders down to the present day-are intertwined with precepts from the catechism in the living culture of many Chinese Catholics, especially in rural communities. . . . Catholicism in China, especially in the rural areas where the vast majority of Chinese Catholics live, is as much folk religion as world religion " (2001:234) . This phenomenon has been termed "Folk Catholicism," coined in much the same manner as the term Folk Buddhism. The extent to which identifying as Catholic and popular religion are intermixed will also be examined in the analysis.
Neither Protestant Christianity nor Islam has been linked to popular or folk religion in the way that Buddhism, Daoism, Confucianism, and Catholicism have. Given the exclusivist theology of each of these religions, 4 we expect that self-identified Protestant Christians and Muslims will be less likely to participate in popular religion or hold popular religious beliefs.
PREDICTING POPULAR RELIGIOUS ADHERENCE
Modernizing Ideologies
Classical theories of secularization contend that "modernization leads to less religious commitment because of the growth of education, science, and a technological worldview" (Ruiter and van Tubergen 2009:866) . The modern, scientific worldview propagates through macro level changes such as an increase in higher education, which affects individual-level religiosity as people abandon religious explanations of phenomena in favor of rational and scientific explanations. In China, secularization is not only thought to be a natural product of modernization, but is also a deliberate social engineering project headed by the CCP who promotes Leninism-Marxism atheistic ideologies and suppresses religion-popular religion in particular is suppressed because of its "backwards "and "superstitious" nature (Feuchtwang 1989; Feuchtwang and Wang 1991; Goossaert and Palmer 2011; Nedostup 2010; Overmyer 2001) . Many sociologists of religion feel that classical secularization theory is outdated, and others argue that the CCP softened its view on religion beginning in the 1990s (Potter 2003) . Nevertheless, the idea that a modernizing worldview decreases religiosity is still influential in research and deserves serious attention in the context of China. Because level of education has been used to proximately measure the extent of modernity (see Ruiter and van Tubergen 2009) , we include education level as an independent variable predicting popular religious adherence and expect to find a negative relationship.
Existential Security
Norris and Inglehart's (2011, first edition 2005) more recent theory of existential security sheds light on the role security may play on religiosity. Norris and Inglehart theorize that societies and individuals with more existential securityin other words, less need to worry about the basic essentials of life-tend to have lower levels of religious adherence on average, controlling for other factors. The reasoning behind this relationship is that once people have their basic needs met, there is less of a need to rely on the supernatural (see Olson 2011) . Consequently, Norris and Inglehart propose that in welfare states, there is less religiosity because of social welfare nets such as the redistribution of income, and access to good, affordable healthcare. They provide substantial evidence to back up their theoretical claims. Since that time, the findings of several studies appear to support Norris and Inglehart's initial findings. Most of these studies are also cross-national comparisons and find negative relationships between macro measures of existential security and rates of religious attendance and belief (see Aarts et al. 2010; Crockett and Voas 2006; Ecklund et al. 2008; Ruiter and van Tubergen 2009; Tubergen 2006) . The dataset used in this study provides three BUDDHIST IDENTITY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 239 variables that can act as measures of existential security on the individual levela measure of the individual's perceived health, a measure of the respondent's feelings on social inequality, and household income. Based on the rationale of existential security theory, we expect a positive relationship between having poor health and popular religions adherence, as those with poor health will have more existential need. We also expect to find a positive relationship between feeling that inequality is a problem and popular religious adherence, feeling that inequality is a serious problem likely leads to existential insecurity. Because family income should improve existential security for individuals, we expect family income to have a negative relationship with popular religious adherence.
A caveat is necessary. Many previous studies on Chinese popular religion do not investigate the attractiveness of popular religion among people with poor health or economic status from the perspective of existential security. The same is true of research on mental and physical health and religiosity in the United States (Hackney and Sanders 2003; Levin and Markides 1986; Son and Wilson 2011) . However, it does not mean that the existential security theory is independent or even conflicts with the generic psychological dynamics on the individual level highlighted in these studies. On the contrary, they can mutually supplement each other. Thus, even though we consider the subjective measure of health from the perspective of existential security, it also has implications for the relationship between social and psychological dynamics and religiosity.
Specifically, popular religion in many Eastern societies has always been attractive to those with poor health status. One reason is that popular religion practices promise immediate rewards (Stark et al. 2005; Weller 1994 ), so that followers, especially those with poor health, turn to popular religion for healing. Actually, many people in China worship folk religion deities out of pro-health intents, as shown in many existing field studies (e.g., Chau 2006; Fan 2003) . Besides the immediate rewards, another reason for the propensity of those with poor health to endorse popular religion is that popular religion, as part of traditional Chinese culture, provides a unique discourse to define and cure disease, such as mental illness (Lai and Surood 2009; Lam et al. 2010) . In China, "people believe that many illnesses are supernatural in origin" (Lam et al. 2010:36) . Therefore, it is not uncommon that those who are sick in traditional China are prone to turn to specific folk religion practices. One example in this light is the practice of calling soul ( jiao hun), which is used to call back someone's lost soul (Cohen 1990; Harrell 1979) and generally believed to be associated with spiritual healing (Harrell 1991) . As for the popular religion among lower class individuals, one readily noticeable reason might be the potential monetary rewards (e.g., winning a lottery) anticipated by popular religion followers. This can be consolidated by the widespread worshipping of the god of wealth (caishen) in contemporary China (Ma 2011; Yang and Hu 2012) . Additionally, relative to the high literacy requirement of other religions in China, popular religion has a lower threshold. Therefore, as put by Jordan and Overmyer in their studies of Taiwan folk religion groups pailuan (1986:279 -80) "The appeal of pailuan in particular, logically, should be to those individuals who both have need of feeling meritorious and are cut off from performance of activities which are culturally defined as merit-producing or as characteristic of meritorious people, and which pailuan imitates." In summary, previous historical and field research points out the psychological, cultural, and economic reasons for the attractiveness of popular religion to individuals of poor health and lower class. These explanations do not conflict with the hypotheses drawn based on the existential security theory. What the existential security theory emphasizes is that in a society where meeting basic needs is more in question (such as traditional agricultural China), people may have a strong reliance on religious or even magical endeavors. However, in the process of moving toward a welfare society, such reliance may be weakened.
5 For instance, people may become less likely to turn to spiritual healing through popular religion when universal health insurance is available. In this light, existential security theory is consistent with previous studies in that feeling of low existential security implies stronger psychological, cultural, and economic dynamics motivating people to practice popular religion, and vice versa. Also, seen from this perspective, the growth of existential security is related but not equivalent to the modernization process, especially in light of the fact that modernization in China is part of a cultural and political project driven by the state.
Urban versus Rural Residency
Anthropologists have highlighted the functional roles of popular religion in China's rural areas, leading the authors to include rural residency as an independent variable predicting popular religious participation. We expect to find this association because many scholars understand the resurgence of popular religion in rural areas in the context of its communal and cultural functions, while popular religion is not thought to serve these functions in urban areas (Ahern 2008; Dean 1995 Dean , 2003 Eng and Lin 2002; Feuchtwang 1996 Feuchtwang , 2001 Tsai 2007; Weller 1987) . The resurgence of popular religion in China is part of the conscious restoration of cultural tradition in China's rural areas.
In addition to its cultural importance in rural areas, on the communal level, popular religion functions as a source of social interaction and group ritual in rural China. Popular religion is an important part of everyday life in rural China's communities. In fact, the most important places in rural areas before the communist government came to power were local temples and ancestral halls, and popular religion was deeply connected to communal social life and solidarity (Dean 1995) . The resurgence of popular religion in China is seen as a restoration of this role.
Another reason to expect those in rural areas of China to be more involved in popular religion is provided by research on the communal functions of popular religious rites as a way to provide a supplementary universe to that of the ruling orthodoxy (Feuchtwang 2001) . Rural residents in China are far removed from the politics and the power structure of the nation and have little opportunity to participate in the political process. Popular religion is seen as a way for people in rural areas to symbolically participate in elite roles.
Moreover, research on popular religion in northern rural China finds that monastic Buddhism is less important in these areas; thus, it may be true that the lack of institutional Buddhism in rural areas leads casual Buddhists to participate more in popular religion (DuBois 2005) . 6 Perhaps most importantly, rural -urban comparative studies also highlight the higher level of engagement in popular religion among rural residents (e.g., Liu 2003) . In short, previous work indicates that popular religion does not play as important of a cultural and communal role in urban areas.
Given empirical research and theorizing that highlights the important role popular religion plays in rural areas compared to urban areas, we recognize rural residency as an independent variable and expect it to be positively related to popular religious involvement.
In summary, previous research and theoretical considerations prompt us to include religious identity, level of education, measures of existential security, and rural residency as important independent variables associated with popular religious adherence. In the following analysis, we investigate the predictive power of these variables on popular religious adherence using representative, nationwide survey data.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Data
Attempts have been made to conduct large-scale surveys of religion in mainland China, but the reliability of these surveys has been called into question and the data collected in these surveys have not produced much scholarly work. This paper uses data from the 2007 Spiritual Life Study of Chinese Residents 7 (SLSCR), which is designed to address the lack of reliable survey data on religion in mainland China. The SLSCR is the most comprehensive and recent survey of religion in China available. The questionnaire was designed by researchers at Baylor University and Purdue University, administered by Horizon Information and Consulting Company Limited, and included 88 questions concerning religious beliefs and practices as well as other social and political opinions and attitudes. A multistage probability sampling method was employed to select the cities and towns in the survey. Households were randomly selected within neighborhoods and a KISH grid procedure was used to randomly select respondents from each household. In total, 7,021 respondents 16 years of age and older completed the face-to-face interview. The response rate is rather low at 28 percent; thus, the data set is weighted to reflect population parameters using the 2006 Census of China.
Methods and Measures
We use binary logistic regression to explore the relationship between the key independent variables and popular religion in China. For the dependent variables, we select practices and beliefs that are widely accepted to constitute popular religion in China. Over the past 20-30 years, there has been a scholarly debate over the use of the term popular religion and its meanings (see Bell 1989; Teiser 1995) . Some scholars claim that popular religion is the religion of the folk class, an antithesis of elite religion (Feuchtwang 1974; Harrell 1974 Harrell , 1979 Jordan 1972) . Other scholars contend that popular religion in China refers to the religious or spiritual beliefs and practices that are commonly held by the Chinese, thus the term "popular" religion (e.g., Fan 2003; Freedman 1974) . Furthermore, as China modernized under CCP rule, popular religion came to be defined as feudal superstition by intellectuals and the state (for a review, see Goossaert and Palmer 2011; Nedostup 2010; Overmyer 2001 ). Due to the conceptual complexity and comprehensiveness of "popular religion," there is still no consensus on the substantial definition(s) of popular religion. In this light, we do not engage this debate in the current research. Instead, we examine popular religion by focusing on its representative beliefs and practices because-despite the debate over defining popular religion-there seems to be some consensus as to what practices and beliefs should be called popular religion. Popular religion usually entails practices like ancestor worship or rituals for asking favors, worship of local deities, and beliefs in local deities, souls, spirits, and the active role of gods in personal affairs (Teiser 1995) . Thus, some of the variables in the SLSCR do portray what is considered to be popular religious belief and practice. We include only variables that measure beliefs and practices found in Teiser's (1995) article on defining popular religion in China, which includes things like ancestor worship, belief in and praying to folk Gods, and participation in rites and rituals. These measures are also employed in a recent descriptive study on Chinese folk religion (Yang and Hu 2012) . We incorporate these variables into binary logistic regression models as dependent variables.
The dependent variables measuring popular religious practice and belief in the models are (all coded as 1¼presence of attribute, 0¼no presence of attribute): participated in ancestor veneration in the past year, having an ancestral tablet in respondent's home, making and fulfilling a vow in the past year, participated in fortune telling including palm reading/face reading in the past year, burned incense in the past year, prayed to the God of Wealth, the God of Earth, the God of Stove, etc., or ancestral spirits, belief in spirits, belief in ghosts, belief in sages, belief in the God of Wealth, belief in ancestral spirits, belief in destiny, believe God/gods is/are involved in personal affairs. We recognize that there may be some debate over labeling some of these variables as popular religious adherence-especially making and fulfilling a vow, which is also found in institutional religions. However, we believe that it is more appropriate in an empirical study to apply broad measures of popular religion rather than focusing on definitional theoretical debates (as mentioned above). Besides, the aspects of Chinese popular religion shown by our measures have been addressed in previous research, e.g., the seminal article by Teiser (1995) and the recent empirical study by Yang and Hu (2012) .
To measure religious affiliation, respondents were first asked, "Do you have any religious belief?" Respondents who answered in the affirmative were then asked, "regardless of whether you have been to churches or temples, do you believe in any of the following?" Available options were Buddhism, Daoism, Confucianism, Protestantism, Catholicism, Islam, Chairman Mao, and "I do not believe in anything." Survey questions that measure religious identity or affiliation are inherently imperfect because of the symbolic significance of claiming a religious identity and what this means to different individuals. Thus, the meaning of being Buddhist or Daoist is not clear. This is especially true in China where religious identity does not necessarily denote exclusive or strong commitment. Something unique to the SLSCR is that respondents could select more than one religion in answer to the question. Because China's religious landscape is a rich tapestry of interrelated religious traditions and practices, this type of survey question is appropriate. Analysis in this study includes respondents who selected the above options in any of the iterations. For example, a respondent is considered a Daoist if he or she selected only Daoism in response to the above question or if he or she selected Daoism and something else. Most respondents only selected one religious affiliation. Respondents who identified as Buddhist were asked, "Did you have a formal conversion ceremony." Because taking the refuges is not the same as Christian baptism, we refer to Buddhists who have participated in this ritual as committed rather than converted. Those Buddhists who had ritually committed to Buddhism were coded as "formal Buddhists," those who had not formally committed but self-identified with Buddhism were coded as "casual Buddhists." These categories are mutually exclusive.
Education is measured using the question "which of the following best describes your highest level of education" (1, less than elementary; 2, elementary; 3, junior high, high school, or technical college; 4, college; 5, bachelor's degree; and 6, master's degree and above). We measure existential security with three variables. Questions on personal and household income resulted in large amounts of nonrandom missing data (over 50 percent missing). Hence, we choose to use an alternative measure of income based on interviewer's assessments of the economic status of the interviewees' family (lower, average, middle -high, high). Another variable used to measure existential security asks respondents, "There are many social problems in our society today. Do you think the social inequality is a serious problem where you live?" The respondents can then choose from the options: 1-not serious at all, 2-not very serious, 3-somewhat serious, 4-very serious. Measures of inequality are often used in macro level tests of existential security theory (e.g., Norris and Inglehart 2011) . We also use a measure of perceived overall health with the question, "how is your overall health these days?" With the responses ranging from 1, very good, to 5, not good. While we use individual-level data, the same logic applies to macro level tests of existential security-those who feel that inequality is a serious problem or who have a low assessment of their overall health should have higher levels of existential need and be more likely to participate in religion. Families with higher economic standing should have less existential need and be less inclined to participate in popular religion. Rural residency is measured with a binary yes/no variable (1, rural; 0, urban).
Additional control variables are also included. These are gender (1, male; 0, female), Chinese Communist Party membership (1, yes; 0, no), ethnicity (1, Han; 0, others), marital status (1, married, 0, not married), and age of the respondent. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the independent variables used in the models. Table 2 shows the dependent variables measuring popular religious belief and practice by self-identified or casual Buddhists (respondents who identified as Buddhist but have not formally committed), formal Buddhists (respondents who have ritually committed to Buddhism), and the rest of the non-Buddhist population. The clear descriptive pattern here is that selfidentified Buddhists participate in and believe popular religion at higher rates than the rest of the population and-contrary to expectation-formal Buddhists believe and participate at higher rates than self-identified Buddhists. Table 2 also shows that veneration of ancestral spirits is a widespread practice in China, but other popular religious practices are not as widespread. Belief in ancestral spirits and belief in destiny are also fairly common and popular religious beliefs are generally more widespread than popular religious practice.
RESULTS
The most telling trend across tables 3 and 4-showing results of the binary logistic regression models-is that being a Buddhist, whether self-identified or formally committed, significantly increases the odds of holding popular religious beliefs (all six measures) and participating in popular religious practices (all seven measures). This is strong evidence for the conflation of popular religion and Buddhism in contemporary China on a large scale. In many cases, identifying as a formally converted Buddhist is the strongest predictor of popular religious belief and practice: belief in spirits and gods [(odds ratio [OR] belief in ghosts (OR 14.550), belief in ancestral spirits (OR 6.991), believing in the God of Wealth (OR 11.693), belief in destiny (6.276), believing gods are involved in personal affairs (OR 26.399) having an ancestral tablet in the home (OR 3.612), participating in fortune telling (OR 3.759) , and burning incense (OR 66.278 ). Identifying as a Buddhist who has not ritually committed is often the second strongest predictor of both popular religious belief and practice. In short, analysis shows that there is a strong relationship between identifying as a formally committed Buddhist and popular religion. Additionally, the odds of popular religious involvement are higher for formally committed Buddhists than for casual Buddhists. This is contrary to what we expected based on theorized differences between institutional and loosely organized religion as well as attempts to modernize institutional Buddhism. We reflect on these surprising findings in the Discussion section. Table 3 provides evidence of a positive relationship between Daoism and popular religious belief. Identifying as a Daoist was a significant, positive predictor of holding six of the seven popular religious beliefs included in the models shown in table 3. Table 4 reveals that identifying as Daoist is the strongest predictor of praying to folk gods or ancestors (OR 23.157) but is not a significant predictor of the other popular religious practices in the models. In short, while the models in tables 3 and 4 provide evidence of a relationship between Daoism and popular religious belief, the relationship does not seem to hold up when considering popular religious practice. Also, Daoist identity does not predict popular religious belief and practice to the same extent as Buddhist identity.
The Protestant and Muslim variables provide interesting and seemingly counterintuitive results. Identifying as Protestant is a significant predictor of believing in spirits and gods, believing in ghosts, and belief in destiny. This finding is most likely due to "spirits," "ghosts," and "destiny" having separate Christian and popular religious meanings and this diversity of interpretations not being accounted for in the survey questions. Identifying as Muslim or Protestant also significantly predicted believing that God or gods were involved in respondent's everyday affairs. Again, our interpretation of this finding is that the survey question is not designed to differentiate between the monotheistic Christian and Muslim understanding of "God" and folk "gods" resulting in a positive, significant relationship for adherents to several of the institutional religions included in the model (the Chinese word shen is used in the survey). For all other variables, self-identifying as Muslim or Protestant is either not statistically significant or renders one less likely to participate in popular religion or have popular religious beliefs. The expected relationship between Catholicism and popular religious belief and practice appeared for two variables: belief in ancestral spirits and belief in the god of wealth. However, no consistent relationship between Catholic identity and popular religious activity was found in the analysis.
Rural residency is a significant predictor of venerating ancestors, having an ancestral tablet in the home, and believing in ancestral spirits, but is not a significant predictor on the other dependent variables or had a significant, negative relationship. This is surprising considering the substantial literature that highlights the functional role of popular religion for rural communities in China and is discussed further below.
Results pertaining to the education variable provide very little support for classical secularization predictions of who participates in popular religion. Education has a significant negative effect for only one variable: belief in ancestral spirits. However, the education variable also demonstrates a significant positive effect on belief in destiny and making and keeping a vow. Moving one category up on the education variable significantly predicted belief in sages, which makes logical sense, given that those with more education are likely more cognizant of the works and history of traditional Chinese sages. The assumed effects of education on religiosity and popular religious adherence specifically are not supported by our findings.
Among the popular religious beliefs included in our analysis, six of the seven revealed a positive relationship with respondents feeling that the gap between rich and poor is a serious social problem. In other words, those who view inequality as a serious problem had increased odds of holding popular religious beliefs. This pattern holds true for three measures of popular religious practice, venerating ancestral spirits, fortune telling, and praying to folk gods or ancestors. Family income shows the expected negative relationship on four of the dependent variables: belief in spirits and gods, belief in ghosts, venerating ancestral spirits, and having an ancestral tablet in the home. Family income also had a significant positive effect on participation in fortune telling. In Yang and Hu's descriptive research on the relationship between household economic status and the odds of participation into folk religion (2012), they found that people at the two ends of the spectrum of household income are more likely to get involved in popular religion, a pattern called "the poor want their fortune told while the rich like to burn incense" (qiong suanming fu shaoxiang)" (517). By detailing different practices and beliefs of popular religion, this study extends Yang and Hu's finding and clarifies the complex relationship between household income and popular religion. Having a poor assessment of overall health had the expected positive relationship in four of the models. In sum, the findings reveal more support for existential security theories than classical secularization theories, but the findings are not consistent across popular religious practices.
Another finding of interest is the consistent pattern of women being more likely to believe and practice popular religion. All seven models predicting popular religious beliefs reveal that, controlling for other factors, women tend to be more involved in popular religion than men. The models also predict that women are significantly more likely to participate in fortune telling and praying to folk gods or ancestors. These findings are consistent with other research that shows women are more likely to be religious than men across many culturesalthough the finding is not universal (e.g., Sullins 2006; Yang and Hu 2012) . It is also interesting to point out that the gap between women and men in popular religious belief is more pronounced than for popular religious practice. This is consistent with findings in the United States, which show that while women are more religious in general, the gap is greater for affective rather than active religiosity (e.g., Sullins 2006 ). The models also show that men are more likely to venerate ancestral spirits and have an ancestral tablet in the home, although they are not more likely to believe in ancestral spirits. This may be explained by the patriarchal structure of Chinese family relations where within a marriage, it is the male's responsibility to venerate ancestors and a female may not have the opportunity to venerate her ancestors after marriage.
DISCUSSION
This study marks the first attempt to explore two aspects of popular religion in mainland China using nationwide survey data: (1) the eclectic mixing of popular religion and other religious traditions; and (2) the social factors predicting popular religious belief and practice. The central finding from this research is that there is a clear relationship between identifying as a Buddhist and participating in popular religion in contemporary China. Moreover, this relationship is constant across various measures of popular religion and the relationship is always positive. While this finding may not be surprising to some, the overwhelming strength of this relationship and the very strong link between formally committed Buddhists and participating in popular religion provides interesting new insight into this relationship.
Based on conceptualizations of the differences between institutional and loosely organized religion as well as efforts to differentiate institutional Buddhism from "superstitious" practices, we expected that Buddhists who had BUDDHIST IDENTITY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 251 not formally committed would be more likely to mix Buddhism and popular religion. Given the results of the analysis, it seems plausible that formally committed Buddhists are more religious in general than self-identified Buddhists and this translates into higher rates of participation and belief in popular religion. The implications of this finding for our expectations are two-fold: first, the divide between loosely organized and institutional religion in China is not pronounced. This further implies that participating in formal Buddhist conversion rituals is not seen as exclusive and is not associated with clear religious boundaries as is often the case in the Western context. Another possibility is that Buddhism and popular religion have been mixed to the extent that many popular religious beliefs and practices are taken to be Buddhist. This supports the commonly accepted idea that there is not a clear delineation between loosely organized and institutional religion in the Chinese context-at least as it pertains to institutional Buddhism and loosely organized popular religion. Second, this finding implies that the efforts of Buddhist leaders and the state to distance institutional Buddhism from popular religion have not been successful. Buddhism and popular religion are still conflated to a great extent, though there is no way to know longitudinally if the degree of eclecticism has decreased from the data used in this study.
It is important to point out that the causal direction of the relationship between Buddhism and popular religion cannot be confirmed with our statistical analysis of a cross-sectional data. Consequently, it is impossible to know if Buddhist identity leads people to participate in popular religion, or, conversely, if people who tend to be religious in a "traditional Chinese" sense tend to identify as Buddhist. Therefore, the documented relationship between Buddhism and popular religion may be also attributed to the fact that many Chinese who are participating in popular religion claim a Buddhist identity because of the legitimacy it affords as one of the officially accepted institutional religions in China that has been favored by the CCP (Laliberté 2011) . In this context, many selfidentified Buddhists who have little knowledge of Buddhist philosophy and practice may use a Buddhist identity as a way to label their traditional Chinese religious practices and beliefs. The legitimacy of Buddhist identity may also explain why the link between Buddhist identity and popular religious activity was stronger than that between Daoist identity and popular religious activity. In other words, this finding may not imply that Buddhism has a stronger historical link to popular religion than Daoism; rather, it may be depicting respondents' claiming a Buddhist identity to gain legitimacy.
Another important consideration is the lack of predictive power for the rural residency variable. While a strong relationship exists between ancestor veneration and rural residency, rural residency is not significantly correlated with other dependent variables in the models. A significant and important literature stresses the functional roles popular religion plays in the day-to-day life of rural China. It may be that the insignificance of the rural residency variable can be attributed to a lack of variables measuring beliefs and practices specific to certain villages and regions in China 8 (for example, no variables measuring belief in or worshiping of Mazu which is prominent in southern coastal regions). Respondents may also have interpreted the questions about popular religion based on their individuallevel functions, such as performing rituals for personal favors, rather than communal level functions, such as group rituals that provide social interaction in the community. This may explain why living in a rural area is a significant predictor only for variables related to ancestor worship (see Weller and Rubinstien 1999) . Also, it is possible that this relationship exists at other levels of analysis, such as province, city, village, etc. Future research employing multilevel analysis may be able to shed light on the impact of nested levels of data on popular religious belief and practice.
On the other hand, there might be spatial difference in the effects of the key predictors used in this study. Accordingly, we conducted another preliminary analysis. We ran the same models but filtered out rural and urban residents in separate analyses. For many of the dependent variables in our study, the rural and urban analyses had different significant independent variables. One key finding in this regard is that the secularization and existential need variables were significant predictors in many of the rural resident models, but were never predictors in the urban resident models.
9 This leads us to believe that the secularization and existential need measures may be interacting with the rural residency variable. In other words, the existential need variables matter more in rural areas. One explanation for this finding might be the fact that the educational level as well as the extent of existential security among rural residents is on average much lower than that of urban residents. In this case, the effect of improvement in education and existential security are more likely to have a pronounced effect. Future research should further explore this finding. It is also worth noting that Buddhist identity was the most consistent predictor of popular religious belief and practice for both the rural resident and urban resident models. The lack of predictive power for the rural residency variable may also be related to another spatial difference in religious life in China. During the reform period, rural areas have experienced weaker political control and because of this exhibit faster rates of religious revival. One effect of greater political control in urban areas is a shortage of religious sites. The exception to this pattern is Buddhist temples, which are being built or revived in urban areas for various reasons including increased tourism (Fisher 2011) . Thus, rural/urban differences in religious life may be less pronounced for Buddhists, which likely explains why Buddhism is a strong 8 It is also possible that popular religious beliefs and practices are reviving in urban areas as well as rural areas. For example, Yang (2005) in an ethnographic study of Christian converts dispels the myth that Christianity is weak in urban areas. Ethnographic studies of popular religion in urban settings may find that it is reviving in urban areas also. 9 Tests of collinearity such as VIF and eigenvalues revealed no multicollinearity between rural residency and the secularization and existential need variables. predictor of popular religious belief and practice in both rural and urban areas. The implications discussed here are speculative and require further exploration.
This study finds little support for the classical secularization theory prediction concerning the impact of education on popular religious adherence. This finding makes sense in light of the fact that popular religious practice in China is increasing despite the fact that Chinese society is modernizing through comprehensive economic reforms. Perhaps, as Weller (2004) suggests, there is no inherent tension between modernization and popular religion because of popular religion's adaptability. This finding also echoes Hu and Leamaster's study (2013) , which finds that as Taiwanese society modernized, popular religious involvement also increased. Additionally, the insignificant association between educational attainment and the propensity of involvement in popular religion suggests that the state's modernization efforts, such as raising the educational level of Chinese citizens, will not dampen once-labeled superstitious activities.
Our study does find support in favor of existential security theory, particularly in regard to feeling that inequality is a serious social problem. In more than half of our models, this variable was a significant predictor of popular religious adherence. In light of the increasingly exacerbated social inequality in Chinese society, it may be reasonable to expect increases in popular religious involvement. However, it should be noted that more research on the effects of existential need on religious practice in China is needed. Longitudinal data and measures of overall economic development and inequality at the macro level are needed for a more robust test of the affects existential need has on popular religious belief and practice. Furthermore, the effects of subjective measures of health and popular religious involvement should also be considered further, especially with the recent availability of reliable survey data.
The findings from this study also highlight important considerations for future research on religion in China-whether qualitative or quantitative. For researchers embarking on quantitative studies of religion in China, it is important to be cognizant of the strong relationship between Buddhist identity and popular religion in China and account for the possible intermixing of the two in statistical models. The problematic issue of religious identity in survey research is exacerbated in the Chinese context and requires careful attention. For researchers embarking on qualitative studies of religion in China, case studies of Buddhist sites and case studies of popular religion in rural communities should consider the intersection between Buddhism and popular religion. In addition, researchers should strive to make distinctions between self-identified Buddhists who have not ritually committed and Buddhists who have when considering the relationship between Buddhism and popular religion. Additionally, future research should look for empirical evidence of the relationship between Buddhist identity and popular religion in Taiwan, where, similar to mainland China, popular religion is mixed with Buddhism and Daoism. Buddhism in Taiwan has also undergone reforms with the goal of becoming more modern and pragmatic, as evidenced by the growth of Buddhist organizations in the 1990s (Madsen 2007) . However, it is unclear whether these efforts have effectively reduced the amount of mixing of popular religion and Buddhism in Taiwan.
